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Hollandale Apartments & Health Club, LLC v. Bonesteel, 209 A.D.3d 1131, AppDiv, Third Dept. (Opinion by Pritzker, J.)
In landlord's action for a declaratory judgment that its denial of tenant's request to have an emotional support dog did not violate the Fair Housing Act of state Human Rights Law, tenant appealed from Supreme Court's denial of tenant's motion for final judgment on tenant's counterclaims. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that statements by a prior Supreme Court justice did not bar Supreme Court from holding a hearing on the reasonableness of tenant's proposed accommodation.
Tenant, who has been diagnosed with a depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, requested an accommodation from landlord's no-pet policy to permit an emotional support dog. Tenant submitted a supporting letter from his treating psychologist. Landlord then brought this action for a declaratory judgment, and permitted tenant to renew his lease for only three months rather than one year. Tenant contended that landlord had engaged in impermissible discrimination and retaliation in violation of the FHA and the HRL. Supreme Court initially held for landlord, holding that tenant had failed to prove that the support dog was a necessary accommodation, and had failed to prove retaliation. The justice, however, had said that tenant's request appeared reasonable. On tenant's initial appeal, the Appellate Division decided that tenant had a qualifying disability and that having an emotional support dog would be a reasonable accommodation, but the court expressly declined to decide whether landlord knew about the disability, whether landlord denied tenant's request, and whether the requested accommodation was reasonable. The court did hold that landlord had improperly retaliated against tenant, and remitted to Supreme Court to resolve remaining questions, including the appropriate remedy for retaliation. Upon remittal, a different Supreme Court justice denied tenant's motion for a judgment that landlord had improperly discriminated. The justice denied the motion, concluding that factual issues remained about whether the type of dog tenant wanted would pose a safety risk to other tenants. On that issue, the court decided a hearing was necessary. Tenant appealed.
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