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Over the last 25 years, since its adoption by Congress in 2000, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) has been the subject of much litigation, when religious organization have tried to establish uses otherwise inconsistent with local zoning. RLUIPA tries to create a balance between local zoning authority and the free practice of religion. In particular, RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing a ‘substantial burden’ on a person’s or religious institution’s ‘religious exercise’ unless the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. §2000cc(a)(1).” Significantly, the issues the courts have dealt with are whether the denial of a religious use at a specific location places a substantial burden on religious observance, or if the denial of such a use in a specific location is a proper exercise of government authority. Further, another question often addressed is whether there are potentially other nearby properties where the religious use might reasonably locate.
In Spirit Of Aloha Temple v. County Of Maui, 132 F.4th 1148 (9th Cir. 2025), the court addressed the issue of whether the substantial burden test is a question of fact that should be presented to a jury, or a question of law to be determined by the court. The court noted that the First and Sixth Circuits had previously determined that the substantial burden issue is a question of law. In what was a case of first impression for the Ninth Circuit, the court agreed the substantial burden test is a question of law for the court to decide. However, after a detailed analysis which concluded it was a question of law, the court then applied an exception to the very rule it had just implemented.
“Because the substantial burden inquiry involves defining the bounds of a legal principle, we conclude that it is a question of law and, therefore, that the district court erred in submitting this question to the jury.” However, for reasons noted below the court did not overturn the failure of the district court to address the issue.
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