Features
Robert D. Goodman
&
Steve Vaccaro
The Third Circuit's <i>Treesdale</i> decision last year understandably drew considerable attention in coverage circles: It was apparently the first reported appellate decision holding that a years-long course of manufacturing asbestos products, resulting in numerous bodily injury claims, constituted a single occurrence. <i>Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc.</i>, 418 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2005). The court's single-occurrence ruling was significant because it meant, in combination with other policy provisions, that the insurer was obligated to pay only a single per-occurrence limit under 10 consecutive policies in respect of its policyholder's entire asbestos liability. <i>Treesdale</i> has potentially broad application in a variety of long-tail liability contexts where per-occurrence limits may be the most important or even sole effective limit of liability. Add the fact that <i>Treesdale</i> was decided as a matter of law, and <i>Treesdale</i> qualifies as a landmark decision in the notoriously results-driven world of number-of-occurrences litigation.
Features
Kirk A. Pasich
Most insurance coverage litigation starts with a fundamental dispute over what an insurance policy means. Unfortunately, while California appellate courts have addressed the subject for decades, and while the California Supreme Court attempted to restate the basic principles, there still is considerable debate among litigants and courts as to how insurance policies are to be interpreted. Insurance carriers often contend that California is not as 'pro-insured' as it once was regarded. They often argue that insurance policies should be interpreted simply based on policy language, without reference to any external information, and that if the insured is 'sophisticated,' any ambiguity should be resolved against coverage. However, neither of these arguments is in accord with California law.
Features
Debra Sydnor
&
Joshua Becker
If a doctor's mistakes can be broadcast over the Internet for all the world to see, will he or she be more or less likely to settle a claim? What about plaintiffs? What are the implications for them should their suits against doctors and hospitals some day become public knowledge?<br>Government entities, private groups and even disgruntled private citizens are starting to use the Internet to broadcast their displeasure with what they see as 'dangerous doctors' or 'money-grubbing plaintiffs,' spreading the reach of the Web beyond the boundaries of the litigation itself by naming names of those who sue or are sued for medical malpractice.
Features
Stan Soocher
Copyright Renewal/'Posthumous Work' <br>Radio Broadcasting/Sponsored Airplay<br>Royalty Waiver/Copyright Not Transferred
Features
ALM Staff
&
Law Journal Newsletters
A look at the Duty to Inquire.
Features
ALM Staff
&
Law Journal Newsletters
Analysis of key rulings.
Features
ALM Staff
&
Law Journal Newsletters
In-depth analysis of recent rulings.
Features
ALM Staff
&
Law Journal Newsletters
This is Part Two of a two-part interview, coordinated by <i>Entertainment Law & Finance</i> Editor-in-Chief Stan Soocher, with Santa Monica-CA-based entertainment Henry Root. In Part One, Root, who has extensive experience handling legal issues for music-driven television productions, discussed considerations in clearing rights in, and determining fees for, songs and sound recordings used in a production, as well as how option rights for the music are negotiated. Root also began, and continues here, a discussion of the issues to be negotiated for a record label to waive its exclusive right to the services of an artist who will appear in a TV music production. Root also discusses copyrights in artist TV performances, reciprocal rights with record labels, holdbacks on exploitation, and warranties and representations.
Features
ALM Staff
&
Law Journal Newsletters
A Look at a recent Donnelly Act claim.
Features
ALM Staff
&
Law Journal Newsletters
In last month's issue, we looked at a hypothetical case in which Lynne and her soon-to-be ex-husband David have drafted a child custody agreement giving Lynne primary legal and physical custody of their daughter, Jane. Neither had raised the issue of what would happen if the primary custodial parent wanted to relocate. Under the governing law of their state, unless the settlement agreement specifically states otherwise, the primary custodial parent is presumed to be able to move to another state for a promotion or unique job opportunity. Lynne informed her attorney that she had accepted a unique job opportunity that would require her to move to another state shortly after the settlement agreement's signing. Our dilemma was: What could, or should, the attorney do to protect Jane's interests? This month, we conclude the discussion.
