Supreme Court Clarifies Standard of Proof for Mixed-Motive Discrimination Cases
At the conclusion of its most recent 2002-2003 term, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision clarifying plaintiffs' standard of proof in "mixed-motive" employment discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In <i>Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa</i>, the Court held that a plaintiff is required to prove by direct evidence that an unlawful factor was a "motivating factor" in the challenged adverse employment action. Instead, a plaintiff can prove his or her discrimination claim in a mixed-motive case by circumstantial evidence. As a result of this decision, defendants will find it more difficult to obtain summary judgment dismissing mixed-motive discrimination cases prior to trial, the result of which will be that more such cases will be subjected to the uncertainties of jury trials.
Child Removal: A Matrimonial Litigator's Checklist
In matrimonial practice, the frequency of child removal litigation has increased exponentially. The growing number of corporate downsizings, business mergers and acquisitions, and the general growth in employment mobility are all likely to result in a continuation of this trend. This article, which provides a checklist of five areas of inquiry, is intended to help the family law litigator anticipate and prepare for the legal and factual issues presented when child removal is in issue.
Plaintiffs' Employment Lawyers Are No Longer Secure
Plaintiffs' employment lawyers contemplating bringing Title VII or other discrimination suits have long felt secure in the knowledge that, even if they lose at trial or at the summary judgment stage, their client will not be assessed attorney's fees. Any ambiguity regarding the meaning of a "prevailing party" entitled to fees under the Federal Rules was resolved by the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC</i>, 434 U.S. 412 (1977). The Supreme Court denied fees to the prevailing defendant employer in that Title VII case, pointing out that the EEOC's actions in bringing the case could not be characterized as without merit or unreasonable. Is that still the case?
The Quest for Class Certification
Last month, we introduced our primer on the "leniency" standard for FLSA actions, and its interplay with Rule 23 guidelines. We called the quest for class certification "the most feared battle waged in litigation," and went on to explain that if well-regarded class action practitioners were surveyed, there would almost assuredly be a consensus that the quest for class certification is exactly that to a targeted defendant.We discussed the FLSA's opt-in burden, and the liberal standard in our previous article. This month, we address the seemingly irreconcilable approaches taken by some courts.
The Wagoner Doctrine Keeps Rolling
A truism of bankruptcy is that assets available to pay creditors are few and far between. Among them are causes of action, and thus both debtors and trustees rightly hoard the right to sue third parties. Does the debtor or trustee have standing to sue when the entity brought the harm upon itself? Generally, the answer is no, and thus in this present environment of corporate misdeeds and scandals, litigation against outsiders is foreclosed by the debtor's own misfeasance.
The <i>Horn</i> Decision: Significant Victory for Employers
New York's Court of Appeals recently issued an important decision in which it declined to expand the narrow exception to the 'at-will' employment doctrine enunciated in <i>Wieder v. Skala</i> for attorneys to physicians employed by non-medical employers. The court's decision in <i>Horn</i>, however, arguably is limited to that particular class of physicians whose duties are not limited to providing medical treatment, but include non-medical-related management responsibilities as well. Consequently, the court will likely be faced with future attempts by professionals, including physicians employed by medical employers, to expand the Wieder doctrine to them.