Circuit Court Win Sets Up Conflict over Bankruptcy Code
A recent circuit court decision regarding the interpretation of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code has set up a conflict between two circuits. On March 15, 2004, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued an opinion regarding whether bankruptcy debtors are required to cure non-monetary defaults prior to assuming unexpired leases under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. ' 365. The First Circuit found -- expressly contrary to a holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals -- that debtors are not required to cure such defaults, resulting in a split in the circuits over a very widely used section of the code.
Supreme Court Disappoints Secured Lenders
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent <i>Till</i> decision on the proper cramdown interest rate will disappoint secured lenders. <i>Till v. SCC Credit Corp.</i>, 124 S. Ct. 1951 (2004). As we show below, Till should be limited to its narrow fact pattern, but is still bad news for lenders. They now will be forced to fight an uphill battle to prove that a higher risk premium should be added to the prime rate applicable to their crammed down secured claim. In Till, the plurality accepted a risk adjustment premium in the range of 1% to 3% (Justice Thomas, concurring, could accept no premium at all). Commercial lenders will thus have to overcome Till by showing that they are entitled to a truly "market" interest rate.
Student Loan Discharge Proceeding Not a 'Suit'
The Supreme Court, in its May 17, 2004 decision in <i>Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood</i>, __ U.S. ___ (2004), declined to reach the issue of whether the Bankruptcy Clause in Article I of the Constitution grants authority to Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity from private suits. Instead, in a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled that a proceeding to determine whether an otherwise nondischargeable student loan can be discharged because of an undue hardship on the debtor is not a "suit" against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. The Court's decision, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, turned on the in rem nature of the proceeding and reasoned that the bankruptcy court did not need jurisdiction over the state where it had jurisdiction over the debtor and her property.
Draw on Letter of Credit Has Same Effect As Cash Forfeiture
It is well-settled that "property of the estate" is broadly defined under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code as including all legal and equitable interests of a debtor. Therefore, the breadth of property of the estate includes a debtor's indirect, residual or reversionary interest in the return of funds. It is also equally acknowledged that, in general, a letter of credit (LC) is an independent obligation of the issuing bank and, under the "independence principle," is not necessarily property of the estate. From time to time, these two concepts -- broad estate interest in property versus the treatment of a LC -- clash in bankruptcy. In these instances, some courts will look at "substance" and not "form" to determine whether the debtor's residual interest in an LC is property of its estate.
Section 502(d) Roulette
Case management in large and complex Chapter 11 bankruptcies has never been easy. Successfully navigating the morass of filing requirements and deadlines contained in the Bankruptcy Code, its accompanying procedural rules and various local court rules can be challenging. When added to the remaining issues that routinely need to be addressed during the course of a case -- among many others, claims resolution, development of a business plan and plan of reorganization, analysis of executory contracts and investigation of potential litigation claims -- the array of activities that must be carefully coordinated can be daunting.
Partnership Taxation in Bankruptcy
Most of the debtors involved in our restructuring work are corporations. On occasion, however, we find ourselves working on a matter involving a bankrupt partnership. Partnerships in bankruptcy raise a host of tax issues that differ from the issues we deal with in our typical corporate debtor work. In this article, we first discuss some basic elements of partnership taxation, and then review some of the tax issues unique to partnerships in bankruptcy.
The 'Doctrine of Necessity'
Last month, we explained that a bankruptcy court lacks "either the statutory or equitable power to authorize" the debtor's payment of pre-bankruptcy nonpriority unsecured claims, as noted in <i>Capital Factors, Inc. v. Kmart Corp. (In re Kmart Corp.)</i> We explained that the clear, no-nonsense opinions of the district court and the Court of Appeals reversed four bankruptcy court orders, and we explained why the Seventh Circuit's <i>Kmart</i> decision is noteworthy. We went on to discuss the "Doctrine of Necessity" (the Doctrine), a current justification used by some bankrtupcy courts to permit the post-petition payment of certain assertedly "essential" pre-petition claims in Chapter 11 reoganized cases. This month, we discuss Principal Judicial Precedents, Decisions Favorable to the Doctrine, Cases Rejecting the Doctrine, and The Rebirth of the "Doctrine of Necessity."
