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New Trial Ordered Where Juror Switched
In a case in which a juror was mysteriously replaced by an alternate without notice to either party or to the judge, Pennsylvania's Supreme Court has ordered a new trial. Bruckshaw v. Frankford Hospital, PICS Case No. 12-2371 (Pa. Dec. 18, 2012) Baer, J.; Castille, C.J., Eakin, J.).
The State's high court voted 5-1 to overturn the jury's defense verdict in a case that charged medical malpractice led to the death of a 47-year-old woman following heart surgery. The jury in the med-mal action had been split 10-2. However, plaintiff's counsel noticed that the jury foreperson's signature on the verdict sheet belonged to juror 20, who was not supposed to have been on the panel. Juror 12, who had been assigned to the jury, was not there. A court officer had switched the two, and without authority.
On appeal, although the plaintiff could not show that prejudice had resulted from the change in jurors, the Supreme Court deemed it prudent to reverse and remand, due to what it termed the “mischief of uncertainty.” Chief Justice Max Baer wrote, “We recognize that granting a new trial is an extreme remedy, but one that is necessary under the circumstances to ensure the integrity of jury trials in Pennsylvania. Because of the obscure nature of the removal and substitution, without notice to the parties and off the record, we cannot discern the cause of this jury irregularity. It is this uncertainty that causes us to impose the remedy of a new trial, to protect the sanctity of the jury from innocent mistakes as well as iniquitous intentions.”
New Trial Ordered Where Juror Switched
In a case in which a juror was mysteriously replaced by an alternate without notice to either party or to the judge, Pennsylvania's Supreme Court has ordered a new trial. Bruckshaw v. Frankford Hospital, PICS Case No. 12-2371 (Pa. Dec. 18, 2012) Baer, J.; Castille, C.J., Eakin, J.).
The State's high court voted 5-1 to overturn the jury's defense verdict in a case that charged medical malpractice led to the death of a 47-year-old woman following heart surgery. The jury in the med-mal action had been split 10-2. However, plaintiff's counsel noticed that the jury foreperson's signature on the verdict sheet belonged to juror 20, who was not supposed to have been on the panel. Juror 12, who had been assigned to the jury, was not there. A court officer had switched the two, and without authority.
On appeal, although the plaintiff could not show that prejudice had resulted from the change in jurors, the Supreme Court deemed it prudent to reverse and remand, due to what it termed the “mischief of uncertainty.” Chief Justice
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