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Enacted as part of the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997, CPLR 213-a provides that “[a]n action on a residential rent overcharge shall be commenced within four years of the first overcharge alleged and no determination of an overcharge and no award or calculation of an award of the amount of any overcharge may be based upon an overcharge having occurred more than four years before the action is commenced. This section shall preclude examination of the rental history of the housing accommodation prior to the four-year period immediately preceding the commencement of the action.” In Conason v. Megan Holding, LLC, NYLJ 2/25/15, p. 22., col. 1., the Court of Appeals affirmed a rent overcharge determination when the first overcharge alleged occurred more than four years before tenant's assertion of the overcharge complaint, affording tenant a remedy against an unscrupulous landlord despite the language of the statute.
The Conason Case
In October 2003, landlord rented the subject apartment to tenant at a monthly rent of $1800. The lease specified that the apartment was rent-regulated, but omitted the Rent Stabilization Rider required for vacancy leases on rent-stabilized apartments. Tenant renewed the lease twice, once for a two-year period beginning Nov. 1, 2005 at a rent of $1899, and then for a one-year period beginning Nov. 1, 2007 at a rent of $1955.97. Tenant paid rent until May 2008, but continued in possession after that date. In April 2009, landlord brought a summary nonpayment proceeding. Tenant counterclaimed, asserting both a breach of the warranty of habitability, and a rent overcharge.
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